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The Domestic Establishment Clause
Josh Blackman*
INTRODUCTION

Two decades ago, immigration scholar Enid F. TruciosHaynes observed in the Georgetown
Immigration
Law
Journal that applying the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause
jurisprudence to long-standing immigration laws “is particularly
awkward.”1 “Under either the Lemon test or the related
‘endorsement’ test, a facially neutral law with a non-secular
purpose is constitutionally suspect. A law that prefers religion
over non-religion is very likely unconstitutional. A law that
overtly prefers certain religious sects over others is almost
certainly unconstitutional.”2 Yet, immigration law routinely does
all of the above, and the courts have not expressed even the
slightest concern for the Establishment Clause—that was until
2017.
Over the past year, several courts have relied on the
Establishment Clause to enjoin President Trump’s entry bans.3
* Associate Professor, South Texas College of Law Houston. This
Article, published as part of the Roger Williams University Law Review’s
2017 symposium, Borders, Bans, and New Americas: Immigration Law in the
Trump Administration, is based on my prior contributions to the Lawfare
blog.
1. Enid Trucios-Haynes, Religion and the Immigration and Nationality
Act: Using Old Saws on New Bones, 9 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 40 (1995).
2. Josh Blackman, The Legality of the 3/6/17 Executive Order, Part III:
The Establishment Clause, LAWFARE (Mar. 15, 2017, 7:28 PM),
https://lawfareblog.com/legality-3617-executive-order-part-iii-establishmentclause.
3. See, e.g., Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554,
572 (4th Cir.), vacated and remanded, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017); Hawai’i v.
Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 1119, 1123 (D. Haw. 2017); Int’l Refugee Assistance
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None of these decisions showed any hesitation before extending
the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence to the
foreign context, with respect to the denial of entry and visas to
aliens abroad.4 Judge Jay Bybee, dissenting from the denial of
rehearing en banc in Washington v. Trump, challenged the
“unreasoned assumption that courts should simply plop
Establishment Clause cases from the domestic context over to the
foreign affairs context ignores the realities of our world.”5 Indeed,
the Federal Government’s brief stressed that Supreme Court case
law “addressing domestic questions involving local religious
displays, school subsidies, and the like . . . have no proper
application to foreign-policy, national-security, and immigration
judgments of the President.”6
Judge Bybee and the government are correct. The Supreme
Court’s Establishment Clause precedents concerning domestic
matters—such as school prayer and public displays of religion—
have had no place in the realm of foreign affairs and national
security. The lower courts should have hesitated before extending
this doctrine to the immigration context. If the Supreme Court
opts to extend this doctrine, the Justices will have to account for
the myriad of other ways in which the government countenances
the use of religion in the immigration context.
I.

PREFERENCE FOR FOREIGN RELIGIOUS MINISTERS

A fitting starting point is a case many lawyers are familiar
with: Rector, Etc. of Holy Trinity Church v. United States.7
Justice Brewer’s 1892 decision is still studied for the “familiar rule
that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not
within the statute, because not within its spirit nor within the
Project v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539, 564 (D. Md.), aff’d in part, vacated in
part, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir.), and vacated and remanded, 138 S. Ct. 353
(2017); Aziz v. Trump, 234 F. Supp. 3d 724, 738 (E.D. Va. 2017).
4. See Blackman, The Legality of the 3/6/17 Executive Order, Part III:
The Establishment Clause, supra note 2.
5. Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d 1168, 1178 n.6 (9th Cir. 2017)
(Bybee, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
6. Josh Blackman, IRAP v. Trump: Applying the “Presumption of
Regularity” in “Uncharted Territories,” LAWFARE (May 9, 2017, 10:30 AM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/irap-v-trump-applying-presumption-regularityuncharted-territories.
7. 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
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intention of its makers.”8 But the facts that gave rise to this
canon of construction are far more relevant to our discussion of
the Establishment Clause.
Congress had enacted a statute that prohibited any
“corporation” from assisting immigrants in entering the United
States to perform labor.9 The plain text of the law would apply to
an incorporated church.10 Yet, the Holy Trinity Court concluded
that Congress did not have in mind “any purpose of staying the
coming into this country of ministers of the gospel,” because
“preaching” is not “labor,” as the term was commonly
understood.11 Indeed, as a general matter, the Court found that
“no purpose of action against religion can be imputed to any
legislation, state or national, because this is a religious people.”12
The opinion cites the godly natures of Columbus’s voyage, the
First Charter of Virginia, the Mayflower Compact, and the
Declaration of Independence.13 Under the Supreme Court’s
modern jurisprudence, such a construction would raise
Establishment Clause concerns, and so the statute should be read
to avoid that outcome; indeed, when the plain text compels that
result, the Holy Trinity Court’s decision becomes even less
justifiable. But such concerns were nonexistent, as the
Establishment Clause lacked any teeth in 1892.
By all accounts, however, Justice Brewer had in fact
ascertained Congress’s intent. Since 1952, when Congress
codified the Immigration and Nationality Act, our law has
afforded a “special immigrant” status to aliens that seek to enter
the United States “solely for the purpose of carrying on the
vocation of a minister of that religious denomination.”14 Through
this law, Congress bestows a benefit exclusively based on the fact
that the alien is a minister. Atheists need not apply. One
scholar observed that the “legislative history of the 1952
amendment to the Federal Immigration Act is replete with
references to religious purpose and motivation,” referencing the
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id. at 459.
Id. at 458.
See id.
Id. at 463.
Id. at 465.
Id. at 465–67.
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(C)(ii)(I) (2012).
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role religion plays in “shaping American culture.”15 The purpose
and effect of this provision is unmistakable: advancing religion.
This background is dispositive for purposes of the Lemon test,
which requires that a statute must have a “secular legislative
purpose.”16
Countless Board of Immigration Appeals decisions have
construed this provision; none raise even the slightest
Establishment Clause doubts. For example, the In re Balbin court
had to determine whether, under an earlier version of the statute,
the church in fact needed the minister’s services.17 Such an
analysis, which invites excessive entanglement, would be verboten
under the Lemon test, which was decided the prior year. Yet, the
case raised no constitutional objections.18
Were the constitutional doubts of the 1952 statute not strong
enough, the implementing regulations that define “vocation” are
even less neutral:
Religious vocation means a formal lifetime commitment,
through vows, investitures, ceremonies, or similar indicia,
to a religious way of life. The religious denomination
must have a class of individuals whose lives are dedicated
to religious practices and functions, as distinguished from
the secular members of the religion. Examples of
vocations include nuns, monks, and religious brothers
and sisters.19
This regulation was deliberately framed to mirror religious
structures similar to that of the Roman Catholic Church, where
officials take a “lifetime commitment,” and not based on other
faiths where spiritual leaders may have different, less-permanent
approaches to devotion.20 More importantly, Professor TruciosHaynes observed, “[n]ontraditional religions, that are not
15.
Brent Baker, The Special Immigrant Exception for Religious
Ministers: An Establishment Clause Analysis, 7 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 97,
101 (1987).
16.
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). See Josh
Blackman, This Lemon Comes as a Lemon: The Lemon Test and the Pursuit
of a Statute’s Secular Purpose, 20 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 351, 356 (2010).
17. 14 I&N Dec. 165, 166 (Reg. Comm. 1972).
18. See In re Balbin, 14 I&N Dec. 165.
19. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(r)(3) (2017).
20. Trucios-Haynes, supra note 1, at 51.
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similarly organized in comparison to religions containing nuns,
monks, religious brothers, and sisters, must explain their religious
doctrine.”21 As a result, she noted, “[t]hese organizations are
subject to a far more searching inquiry by bureaucratic
decisionmakers.”22 Non-Catholics, whose devotion need not be a
lifelong commitment in the same sense as monks or nuns, are
disadvantaged under our immigration laws. Indeed, Professor
Trucios-Haynes’s study of the legislative history reveals a
preference “to permit entry of members of certain religious
denominations, i.e., Roman Catholic members, but to limit the
entry of members of other religious denominations.”23 In any
other context, were Congress to so nakedly prefer religion over
non-religion, and Catholics over non-Catholics, the law would
have already been enjoined. Yet, these provisions have remained
in effect for over half a century, without raising any judicial
doubts. Indeed, recent decisions considering the regulation’s
legality on other grounds did not even mention the Establishment
Clause.24
Though the vocation statute favors religious aliens over nonreligious aliens, it is facially non-denominational. That is, on its
face, the law does not prefer Catholic priests over Jewish rabbis.
The same cannot be said for the Lautenberg Amendment.25
II. PREFERENCE FOR JEWISH AND CHRISTIAN REFUGEES

During the late 1980s, as more Jewish people were permitted
to emigrate from the Soviet Union, there was a movement afoot in
the Reagan Administration to “rethink[] the almost automatic
granting of refugee status” to these aliens.26 In 1989, Senator
Frank Lautenberg (D-NJ) and Representative Bruce Morrison (DCT) introduced a legislative response, that would become known
as the Lautenberg Amendment.27 Section 599D of the Foreign
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 52–53.
24. See, e.g., Shalom Pentecostal Church v. Acting Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., 783 F.3d 156, 159–60 (3d Cir. 2015).
25. Victor Rosenberg, Refugee Status for Soviet Jewish Immigrants to the
United States, 19 TOURO L. REV. 419, 433–34 (2003).
26. Id. at 427.
27. Id. at 433.
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Operations, Export Financing, and
Related
Programs
Appropriations Act stated that “[a]liens who are (or were)
nationals and residents of the Soviet Union and who are Jews or
Evangelical Christians shall be deemed” to be subject to
persecution, unless there was sufficient evidence to the contrary.28
In other words, the law established that by virtue of a Soviet’s
religion—Judaism or Evangelical Christianity—courts should
presume the alien’s claim of persecution. In such cases, the
burden is on the government to establish that no such persecution
is present.29 The Amendment reverses the usual framework,
whereby in most cases, the burden is on the applicant to establish
a claim of persecution.30 Several members of Congress opposed
the bill because it granted preferential treatment to Soviet Jews;
but none objected that favoring Soviet Jews and Evangelicals
would run afoul of the Establishment Clause.31 Ultimately, the
Amendment passed 97–0 in the Senate and 358–44 in the
House.32
As a general matter, many core aspects of refugee law raise
Establishment Clause problems under the Lemon test.33 For
example, “determinations of whether an alien faces a ‘wellfounded fear of prosecution’ based on religion unnecessarily
entangles the government in deciding the contours of spiritual
doctrines.”34 The Lautenberg Amendment, however, does not
merely prefer claims of religious-aliens over non-religious aliens,
but instead grants preferential treatment to two specific sects
within the Soviet Union: Jews and Evangelicals.35 There is no
mistaking the purpose of the law. And its effect was patent. As a
result of the Amendment, the rate of applicants interviewed in
28. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–167, § 599D(b)(2)(A), 103 Stat.
1195, 1262 (1989).
29. See id. § 599D(b)(1), 103 Stat. at 1262.
30. See Rosenberg, supra note 25, at 434.
31. See id. at 434–35.
32. Id. at 435.
33.
See Blackman, This Lemon Comes as a Lemon: The Lemon Test and
the Pursuit of a Statute’s Secular Purpose, supra note 16.
34.
Blackman, The Legality of the 3/6/17 Executive Order, Part III: The
Establishment Clause, supra note 2.
35.
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs
Appropriation Act, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–167, § 599D(b)(2)(A), 103 Stat.
1195, 1262 (1989).
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Moscow that were approved for refugee status increased from
under 78% to 90%, which in effect, raised the prospects of Jews
and Evangelicals to seek refugee status.36 This policy is facially
invalid under the Lemon test.37 Yet, I could not locate even the
slightest suggestion that the Lautenberg Amendment was
unconstitutional.
III. THE DOMESTIC ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE HAS NOT APPLIED IN
FOREIGN CONTEXTS

The Establishment Clause has not applied with full force to
immigration law. This observation is buttressed by the nowfamiliar 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A).38 Enacted as part of the
landmark 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), this
provision was designed to root out discriminatory quotas in
immigration policy.39 It provides:
Except as specifically provided in paragraph (2) and in
sections 1101(a)(27), 1151(b)(2)(A)(i), and 1153 of this
title, no person shall receive any preference or priority or
be discriminated against in the issuance of an immigrant
visa because of the person’s race, sex, nationality, place of
birth, or place of residence.40
If you read it quickly, you may gloss over the fact that there is
a critical element missing from the list of protected classes:
religion. That choice was deliberate. It is perfectly permissible
under the statute to discriminate on the basis of religion when
deciding whether to issue immigrant visas. (Non-immigrant
visas can be restricted based on nationality, or any other basis for
that matter).
Admittedly, no court has ever confronted this question.
However, this uninterrupted, uncontroverted practice,41 should at
least make courts pause before extending Lemon to this context
36.
Rosenberg, supra note 25, at 440.
37.
See Blackman, This Lemon Comes as a Lemon: The Lemon Test and
the Pursuit of a Statute’s Secular Purpose, supra note 16, at 356–57.
38. 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A) (2012).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 689 (1929); see also NLRB v.
Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2559–60 (2014).
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over which Congress has plenary power over naturalization, and
the President has heightened concerns over foreign affairs. The
courts that have invalidated the travel ban have shown no
awareness of this limitation on the domestic Establishment
Clause.42
CONCLUSION

It is not surprising that Establishment Clause challenges to
immigration clauses have not arisen. Imagine if an American
citizen, who was related to a Buddhist living in the Soviet Union,
challenged the Lautenberg Amendment as an unconstitutional
establishment of religion because it deprived his relative of the
opportunity to receive one of the statutorily-limited number of
refugee slots. Such a suit would have been tossed out of court.
Or, a minister who was denied a visa brings suit because the
vocational statute impermissibly favors Catholic
priests.
Likewise, that suit would have no legs to stand on. But, at
bottom, this is the gravamen of the latest round of litigation
concerning the travel ban.
Courts should be very hesitant to apply the Lemon or
endorsement test to the travel bans. Doing so would open the door
to future constitutional challenges to countless provisions of the
INA that grant preferential treatment to aliens of certain religious
sects. And, if the Supreme Court opts to extend this doctrine, the
Justices will have to account for the myriad other ways in which
the government countenances the use of religion in the
immigration context.

42. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 594 (4th
Cir.), vacated and remanded, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017); Washington v. Trump,
847 F.3d 1151, 1157 (9th Cir. 2017); Aziz v. Trump, 234 F. Supp. 3d 724, 727
(E.D. Va. 2017).

